Constitutional Law: Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes by Kinzer, Carolyn
Marquette Law Review
Volume 53
Issue 1 Spring 1970 Article 8
Constitutional Law: Judicial Intervention in
Church Property Disputes
Carolyn Kinzer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Carolyn Kinzer, Constitutional Law: Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 145 (1970).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol53/iss1/8
RECENT DECISIONS
Ohio,33 Illinois,3 4 Oregon, 35 Minnesota,36 Colorado,3 7 and Missouri 3s
have denied it. On an analogous issue, if not facts, a federal district
court recently took the more conservative approach,39 while at the
same time the Internal Revenue Service took the liberal position.40
Examination of the cases from the other states which have granted
the exemption indicates that Wisconsin has gone further than the
others, with the possible exceptions of Florida, where the exemption
was provided by legislative enactment, and Delaware, which seems
to allow a property tax exemption for all organizations not organized
for profit (in Wisconsin, all Chapter 181 corporations). In the Cali-
fornia, Kansas, Montana, and Pennsylvania cases the homes either took
some residents who did not pay their full share or their operation
showed no overall profit, or both, but Wisconsin has granted the
exemption where there is no element of almsgiving at all and the
revenues from the residents exceed the operating expenses.
If the Wisconsin legislature did not intend that all non-profit
homes for the aged meeting the requirements of Chapter 181 should
be exempt from property taxation, some additional guidelines will
have to be set forth to determine which homes are benevolent and
which are not. Further, if the legislature does feel the Milwaukee
Protestant Home for the Aged decision is too broad an interpretation,
there still remains the problem of whether it can effectively establish
definite guidelines requiring a more conservative approach. The job
will not be easy. JosEPE C. BRANCH
Constitutional Law-Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes: Every year a number1 of church property disputes come
before the civil courts. These controversies arise from schisms, political
quarrels within churches, unions or mergers between churches, appoint-
ment of clergy, and expulsion of members. Although courts have tradi-
33 Philadelphia Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, 5 Ohio St. 2d 135, 214
N.E.2d 431 (1966); see also Crestview of Ohio, Inc. v. Donahue, 14 Ohio
St. 2d 121, 236 N.E.2d 668 (1968).
34 Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39, Ill. 2d 149, 233 N.E.2d 537 (1968).
35 Friendsview Manor v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 94, 420 P.2d 77 (1966),
aff'd on rehearing, 247 Ore. 94, 427 P.2d 417 (1967) ; Oregon Methodist Home
v. Horn, 226 Ore. 298, 360 P.2d 293 (1961).36 See Madonna Towers v. Commissioner of Taxation, 167 N.W.2d 712 (Minn.
1969), which quoted from Wisconsin's dissenting opinion.
37 United Presbyterian Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 448 P.2d 967 (Colo.
1968).
35 Defenders' Townhouse, Inc. v. Kansas City, 441 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. 1969).
39 Bank of Carthage v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (a federal
estate tax exemption was denied to a trust fund claimed to be for "charitable
purposes" when the fund was used to maintain a cemetery which provided
no free lots).
40 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 1969-44, at 10, where the same
issue as in the nursing home cases is decided in favor of the tax exemption.
1 About 10 cases per year from federal courts and the highest state courts ap-
pear in the digests.
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tionally disavowed jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical affairs, when
the ultimate issue of the intrachurch dispute involves the use of property
the courts have always assumed jurisdiction in the interest of peaceable
possession. The problem of resolving church disputes has been com-
pounded by the diversity of internal structures among religious groups.
Such structures generally can be classified into three categories: con-
gregational, presbyterial, and episcopal.2 In the congregational form,
each local congregation is self-governing. Among the major denomi-
nations of this form are the Baptist, the Quaker, the Church of Christ,
and some of the Lutheran churches. The presbyterial demoninations are
governed by bodies of laymen and ministers in an ascending succession
of authority: a presbytery over the local churches, a synod over the pres-
bytery, and a general assembly over all. The principal denominations
so organized include the Presbyterian, the Reformed Church in Amer-
ica, the Evangelical and Reformed Church, and some of the Lutheran
churches. In the episcopal form the power resides in the clerical hier-
archy, usually the bishops. The Roman Catholic, the Eastern Orthodox
and the Protestant Episcopal churches are in this category.
The dispute in the recent case of Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church
arose when two Georgia Presbyterian churches withdrew from the hier-
archical general church organization after the General Assembly of the
United Presbyterian Church made certain pronouncements on various
issues, including disobedience, international affairs, and the ordination
of women. The ministers of the two churches renounced the general
church's authority over them. In response, the general church, through
the Savannah Presbytery, established an Administrative Commission to
seek a conciliation. Because it was unable to reach any agreement with
the dissident churches, the Commission proceeded to take over the
local churches' property on behalf of the general church. The local
churchmen made no effort to appeal the Commission's action to a higher
church tribunal, but instead filed suit in the Superior Court of Chatham
County to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the property,
record title to which was in the local churches. The cases were con-
solidated for trial and submitted to a jury on the theory that Georgia
law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general
church as long as the general church adheres to the tenets of faith exist-
ing at the time of affiliation by the local churches. 4
2 One study classifies 99 groups having congregational polity, 52 having presby-
terial, and 79 having episcopal. W. SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 283-84 (1946).
3393 U.S. 440 (1969).
4 GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5506 (1969); Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights
Presbyterian Church [and Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church], 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
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The implied trust theory on which the case was submitted to the
jury had its origins in two English decisions rendered by Lord Chan-
cellor Eldon: Craigdallie v. Aikmans and Attorney General ex rel.
Mfander v. Pearson.6 The first case concerned a chapel purchased by a
congregation when it seceded from the established Church of Scotland
in 1737. A later dispute arose between a majority faction which wished
to adhere to the rulings of the judicatory of the secession church and a
minority faction which claimed that the secession church had approved
a doctrine inconsistent with the original principles of the secession, and
yet another sect was formed. Then the question arose as to which of the
two groups the chapel belonged. Lord Eldon suggested that the court
look to the original principles of the secession and award the use of the
property to the group which adhered to those principles, whether or
not the group constituted a majority of the congregation. Four years
later, in Pearson, a minister and a trustee, professing Trinitarianism,
sought to enjoin the majority of trustees of a meetinghouse from inter-
fering with the use of the meetinghouse by their retention of a Unitarian
minister. Because the dispute was among the trustees in whose name
the property was held, Lord Eldon determined that church property
was held in trust for the propagation of a particular doctrine, and that
it was the duty of the court, whenever disputes arose over who was
entitled to the use and possession of church property, to award the
property to the faction which adhered to the original tenets of faith. It
was the Chancellor's opinion that doctrinal continuity is the essential
characteristic of a church and that doctrinal innovation is tantamount
to a division of an implied contract which bound the members to adhere
to the original tenets of faith.
Although this principle had inherent weaknesses, it became the law
in England. The difficulty a court would have in attempting to interpret
theological doctrine does not seem to have been contemplated by Lord
Eldon. Soon, however, courts found it necessary to distinguish between
fundamental (or substantial) deviations from the original tenets which
had resulted in a diversion of the implied trust, and those immaterial
deviations which could not be held to be such a diversion. For nearly
one hundred years courts blandly attempted to apply Lord Eldon's
principle of the implied trust to disputes over church property. Finally,
in 1904, in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun,
the House of Lords attempted to apply the trust doctrine in awarding
800 churches, three universities, and more than one million pounds of
invested funds to a small group of Scotish congregations who claimed
that the Free Church had departed from past principles when it merged
5 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (H.L. 1813).
6 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817).
7 [1904] A. C. 515 (Scot.).
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with the United Presbyterian Church in 1900. This decision was later
reversed by an act of Parliament because of its obvious impracticality.
The implied trust doctrine was never universally adopted in the
United States. It received its greatest acceptance in the mid-Atlantic,
southern, and midwestern states. In New England, from colonial times
on, the pervading preference for congregational self-government cleared
the way for early acceptance of the concept of majority determination.
When Episcopal groups severed relations with the Church of England
following the American Revolution, it was not considered a breach of
trust. Later, in Massachusetts, when large numbers of congregations
abandoned their beliefs in the Trinity in favor of Unitarianism, the
courts held that religious societies were at liberty to change their de-
nomination by virtue of a provision in the Massachsetts state constitu-
tion that guaranteed the right of the majority to select its ministers.,
At the same time that New England was approving a majority deter-
mination, judges in other parts of the country were enforcing a rule
which closely resembled the English implied trust theory.9
Until the 1871 United States Supreme Court decision in Watson v.
Jones,10 little federal precedent existed because church disputes were
heard in federal courts only on grounds of diversity. No federal question
was thought to exist. The facts giving rise to the controversy in the
Watson case and the facts of the Hull Memorial Church case are quite
similar, although there is an important difference in that the general
church was not a party in Watson. In Watson, the membership of the
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, had divided
over the slavery question. A strong minority of the congregation sup-
ported slavery, while the majority did not. The General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church had previously adopted an anti-slavery position
and therefore recognized the anti-slavery group as entitled to the use of
the church property. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, awarded
the property to the pro-slavery minority. Members of the majority who
were residents of Indiana brought suit in federal court on diversity
grounds. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the lower court in favor of the anti-slavery faction on the principle that
that faction had been recognized by the highest authority of the Church
as entitled to the use of the property. Mr. Justice Miller, writing for the
Court, attempted to distinguish this case from Pearson. He rejected the
English theory of an implied trust, setting forth three general proposi-
tions he felt were consistent with the American notion of separation of
church and state and to which courts could refer when deciding church
property cases.
s Baker v. Fules, 16 Mass. 488 (1820).
9 McBride v. Porter, 17 Iowa 203 (1864) ; Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B.
Mon.) 481 (1847).1080 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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His first rule was that the courts will impose a trust relationship
only when the deed to the property explicitly sets forth the uses to
which and the teachings for which the property is granted.
[W]here the property which is the subject of controversy has
been, by the deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by
which the property is held, by the express terms of the instru-
ment devoted to the teaching, support, or spread of some specific
form of religious doctrine or belief[J
it would ... be the obvious duty of the court ... to see
that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust .... 11
The second rule provided that, in the case of a congregational schism,
the right to control the use of the property lay in the numerical majority
of the members. This rule, though dictum, was grounded on the same
premise as the third rule, i.e., that the use of the church property should
be determined by the persons vested with authority under the rules and
practices of the particular denomination. Watson, however, was decided
on the basis of the third rule, or the rule to be applied to churches in
the presbyterial category, and Justice Miller in explaining this rule
stated :
[W]here the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding
the property is but a subordinate member of some general church
organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals
with a general and ultimate power of control more or less com-
plete ....
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or eccle-
siastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest
of these church judicatories to which the matter has been car-
ried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them ... .-
This sweeping deference to church tribunals with only very limited
civil judicial review was gradually modified in succeeding years, be-
ginning with Bouldin v. Alexander.13 Bouldin announced that in order
for courts to defer to church tribunals it was necessary for the church
authorities to follow their own procedural rules. Basic concepts of equity
require that any tribunal, civil or religious, adhere to previously an-
nounced rules and regulations for the resolution of controversies which
come before it.
The impact of Watson was further minimized by Gonzalez v. Arch-
bishop,'4 where Mr. Justice Brandeis observed:
11 Id. at 722-23.
12 Id. at 722, 727.
13 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
14 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
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In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions
of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical,
although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before
the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest
made them so by contract or otherwise. 15
The court seems to be saying that not only must the church tribunal
follow its own procedural rules, but it must not be guilty of making
an arbitrary decision if civil courts are expected to give effect to the
decision. With only these slight modifications the Supreme Court con-
tinued until the Hull Memorial Church case to apply the rules of Wat-
son and to look to the church tribunals for settlement of religious ques-
tions. But the rules enunciated by Mr. Justice Miller introduced a new
legal problem: how to decide which body has the authority to make
religious determinations when the right is claimed by more than one
group.
In most cases which group constitutes the true governing body is
probably obvious, but there have been several recent cases where the
issue was the identity of the lawful governing body of the American
episcopates of churches with supreme authorities in communist-domi-
nated countries. Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, members
of the American Separatist Movement in the Russian Orthodox Church
declared their autonomy from the mother church in Russia and dis-
putes arose concerning control of the various churches including the
use and occupancy of St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City, the
residence of the ruling archbishop. The New York legislature, in an
attempt to free the Russian Orthodox churches from atheistic and sub-
versive influences, enacted a statute16 which gave control of all churches
in New York formerly governed by the mother church in Russia to
the American Separatist Movement. In St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Ked-
roff," the New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute as constitu-
tional and dispositive of the case. The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed, holding that Benjamin, the bishop appointed by the
Russian Church, was entitled to use and possession of the cathedral. s
The underlying issue was who had the right to appoint the bishop. The
Supreme Court decided, without any explanation, that the right resided
with the church in Russia. This finding led to the conclusion that the
New York Statute was an unconstitutional transfer of control of the
property in violation of the First Amendment.
Kedroff added a new dimension to the whole question of church
property disputes. Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the court, said in re-
ferring to the Watson opinion:
15 Id. at 16.
16 N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAW art. 5-C, §§ 105-108 (1952).
27302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950).Is Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
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The opinion in Watson radiates, however, a spirit of freedom for
religious organizations, an independence from secular control
or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves, free
from state interference, matters of church government as well
as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where
no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now
be said to have federal constitutional protection as part of the
free exercise of religion against state interference. 9
Following the Kedroff decision, various writers asserted the propo-
sition that Justice Reed's language elevated church property disputes
to a constitutional level, while others reasoned that the constitutional
view was an over-extension.2 0 The First Amendment language of the
Court may have been unnecessary, for it would have reached the same
conclusion once the court's findings indicated that the Russian Church
had never relinquished control over the property. Under Watson, the
Court was bound to enforce the determination of the church body
having control of the property. In any event, Kedroff foretold things
to come, for the Hull Memorial Church case clearly raises the issue to
a constitutional level.
In the trial in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, the
two dissident church groups sought to permanently enjoin the Presby-
terian Church in the United States and its officers from interfering with
the plaintiff's exclusive use and control of the local property in Savan-
nah. The Superior Court submitted to a jury the question of whether
the statements of the church's General Assembly on civil rights, civil
disobedience, the Vietnam war, and the change in the church constitu-
tion making women eligible to hold church office, constituted a sub-
stantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the Presby-
terian Church and whether these actions were utterly variant from the
original purposes of the church. The jury found in favor of the local
churches and the Superior Court then enjoined the Presbyterian Church
in the United States from using the local church properties. The general
church appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia and that court af-
firmed the judgments of the lower court. The church's motion for a
rehearing was denied and it applied for a writ of certiorari which the
United States Supreme Court granted so it could consider the First
Amendment questions raised by the petitioners.
The United States Supreme Court held that although civil courts:
are the proper forum for resolving property disputes, the First Amend-
ment forbids them from determining ecclesiastical questions in the
process. The case was remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for de-
19 Id. at 116.
2OL. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDoM 250 (1953); M. DE WOLFE HOWE,
THE JUDICIAL STATUS OF CHURCHES, I CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THE IN-
STITUTE OF CHURCH AND STATE 6 (1958).
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termination of the question on "neutral principles of law."'" The
Supreme Court struck down a portion of the implied trust theory,
"[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust
theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings.1 2 This be-
ing the case, the entire theory must fall. The departure-from-doctrine
element was an integral part of the implied trust theory at its inception
in the early English decisions2 3 and has continued to be an essential
factor wherever the theory has been applied. It seems clear, however,
that the theory can no longer be the basis for settlement of church
property disputes because its application necessitates constitutionally
prohibited inquiry into church doctrine and faith.
What then are the criteria of ownership courts should use in the
settlement of such disputes? Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not
elaborate as to the meaning of "neutral principles of law." It may be
supposed that the reference is to the property laws of the particular
jurisdiction in which the forum is located. Does this mean that which-
ever group holds legal title will prevail in disputes between factions
within a denomination, even one with a presbyterial hierarchy? The
Georgia Supreme Court's decision on remand seems to so indicate.
Without any discussion of equitable principles or equitable trusts, or
any reference to the Watson principles, the Georgia court awarded the
property in dispute to the local churches. But the United States Supreme
Court's decision did not disturb the principles of Watson. Theoretically
then, the ruling of the Church Commission, subject to appeal to the
Church's higher tribunal, ought to be determinative. Upon remand, the
Supreme Court of Georgia assumed that when Georgia adopted the
21393 U.S. at 450.
221d. at 445.
23The Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. The Church
of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., - U.S. - (1970). In a per curiam decision the
Supreme Court affirmed a Maryland court's resolution of a church property
dispute in which the latter court had awarded the property to a secessionist
congregation. The Maryland court had relied upon provisions of state statu-
tory law governing property held by religious corporations, upon the deeds
conveying the property to the local church, and upon provisions in the con-
stitution of the General Eldership for its decision. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision with one statement:
Since, however, the Maryland Court's resolution of the dispute involved
no inquiry into religious doctrine . . . the appeal is dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question.
The majority did not choose to elaborate any further as to the meaning of
"neutral principles of law", but three concurring Justices suggest that a state
may adopt any one of various approaches so long as it involves no considera-
tion of doctrinal matters. Thus the States may adopt the approach of Watson
v. Jones and enforce the property decisions made within a church by a major-
ity of its members in a congregational polity, or the decision of a church
tribunal in a presbyterial polity. But there is nothing in the concurring opinion
to suggest that a state must adopt the Watson formula. Indeed, the opinion
provides two other acceptable approaches. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices
Douglas and Marshall concurred, cites "neutral principles of law" or the
passage of special statutes governing church property arrangements as two
alternatives to the application of the Watson doctrine.
[Vol. 53
RECENT DECISIONS
implied trust theory it did so with the departure-from-doctrine element
as a condition. Without the departure-from-doctrine condition, the im-
plied trust theory cannot be applied since there is no other basis for a
trust in favor of the general church. The Court then determined that
the local churches had legal title by virtue of the original deeds naming
them as grantees. The general church never put any funds into either
of the churches. On this basis, the judgments of the trial court were
affirmed. It seems logical to suppose that the Presbyterian Church in
the United States might again seek a hearing in the United States
Supreme Court on the grounds that the Watson rule for Presbyterial
polities has been violated. That rule, simply stated, is that civil courts
will accept as conclusive the determinations made by the highest church
authorities to which the question has been taken. The general church,
through the Commission established by the Savannah Presbytery, has
ruled that the property belongs to the general church. Nevertheless, the
local church holds legal title and continues in possession under authority
of the Georgia Supreme Court's affirmation on remand of the judg-
ments of the trial court. Perhaps the "neutral principles" applied were
too neutral, and we will have to await a further clarification from the
United States Supreme Court before it can be known what force and
effect is to be given in the future to the 100-year-old-rule of Watson.
CAROLYN KINZER
1970]

